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Abstract 
Economics is increasingly adopting the methodological standards and procedures of the natu-
ral sciences. The paper analyzes this ‘naturalistic turn’ from the philosophical perspective on 
naturalism, and I discuss the implications for the field of finance. The theory of finance is an 
interesting case in point for the methodological issues, as it manifests a paradigmatic tension 
between the pure theory of finance and Behavioral Finance. I distinguish between three kinds 
of naturalism: mark I, the reduction of behavior on psychoneural phenomena, mark II, the 
transfer of patterns of causal explanations from the natural sciences to the social sciences, 
mark III, the enrichment of the ontology from observer-independent to observer-relative facts. 
Building an integrated naturalistic paradigm from these three ingredients, I show that natural-
ism in economics will only be completed by a simultaneous linguistic turn, with language 
being analyzed from the naturalistic viewpoint. I relate this proposition with recent results of 
research into finance, especially connecting Behavioral Finance with the sociology of finance.  
Key words: naturalism, causation in economics, neuroeconomics, Behavioral Finance, social 
ontology, sociology of finance 
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1  The naturalistic turn: Resolving the tension between the pure theory of 
finance and Behavioral Finance  
1.1  The uneasy relation between economics and the sciences 
Economics is undergoing profound changes of its foundations (for a survey, see Davis, 2006). 
On first sight, these are associated with the increasing importance of methods and paradigms 
of the natural sciences in advancing economic knowledge. This is very different from the first 
wave of introducing methods and models from the sciences into economics, which took place 
in the late 19
th century: This was mainly the transfer of analytical approaches without any 
reductionist claims. Central paradigms and concepts of physics were introduced into neoclas-
sical modeling of equilibrium forces in the economy, without implying that this would turn 
economics into a subsection of applied physics (Mirowksi, 1989). This interaction is taking 
place recurrently throughout the history of economics, as in the field of finance theory re-
cently, with the emergence of the “econophysics” stream of research, which transfers analyti-
cal methods such as the notion of scale-free networks, or even quantum physics into the study 
of finance (for surveys, see Mantegna and Stanley, 2000; Baaquie, 2004). 
However, one of the main protagonists of econophysics research into finance argues that this 
more recent transfer also raises a methodological challenge at economics in general and fi-
nance theory in particular. Roehner (2002: Chapter 1) criticizes the established approach in 
economics as being aprioristic in the sense that economic research does not start out from the 
identification of empirical regularities (i.e. phenomenological laws), and then moves on to the 
construction of falsifiable theories that might explain these regularities, but firstly posits theo-
ries, and then tries to confirm or refute them. Thus, economics directly confronts relatively 
simple,  highly  abstract  and  tightly  organized  theories  with  overwhelmingly  complex  eco-
nomic systems, and just skips the most onerous part of the work in the sciences, that is, trim-
ming down complexity into smaller domains of the potential application of theories, and then 
to develop on an observational methodology that allows for the identification of empirical 
regularities in these domains. As a result, economics is very often missing the central explana-
tory concept of the sciences, namely causation. One important illustration is the perennial 
concern for the microfoundations of macroeconomics, which reveals the fact that important 
economic concepts such as the existence of equilibria are not necessarily related with causal 
explanations of the mechanisms generating these phenomena (Hausman, 2006: 10). Thus, 
natural scientists often comment on the perceived distance between economics as an allegedly 
exact social science and the methodological stance of the natural sciences (for another exam-
ple, a leading biologist, see Wilson, 1998: 216ff.). 
This criticism directly reflects the situation in the theory of finance, too, where a dualism has 
surfaced between the standard paradigm of finance theory and the so-called ‘Behavioral Fi-
nance ’. The standard paradigm was created in the 1950s and 1960s in order to provide a 
strong theoretical foundation for the study of finance, which was until then a mere set of insti-
tutional knowledge and practical experience, mostly taught at business schools in the United 
States (for a survey on the history of finance theory, see MacKenzie, 2006). Major theoretical 
breakthroughs such as the Modigliani-Miller theorem or the Capital Asset Pricing Model are The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of Finance 
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firmly rooted in theoretical notions of risk and an abstract conception of arbitrage. However, 
these notions are aprioristic in the sense that they do not start out from observed regularities in 
the capital market, and do not concentrate on causal processes that actually generate observed 
phenomena on the capital markets.  
In fact, for example, the Black-Scholes formula could not be empirically supported in the ini-
tial years, thus might have been regarded as refuted, according to the standards of the sci-
ences. However, in economics the logic of decisions and arbitrage is such a powerful sys-
tematizing force, and has a fundamental paradigmatic significance, so that these refutations 
did not lead to a redesign of the theory. Instead, two other movements were started. The first 
one is to adapt the existing institutional framework of capital markets such that the conditions 
of the theory might begin to hold, which indeed also contributed to improving its empirical 
validity. That is, the modern theory of finance was a driving force of massive regulatory 
changes on the capital markets, especially with regard to options and derivatives (MacKenzie, 
2007). The second one is to further differentiate the theory, especially in the analysis of risk 
factors, with the result of reinstating the validity of the fundamental principles of rationality 
and arbitrage (for a prominent example, see Fama and French 1993). 
Thus, the standard theory of finance qualifies as a progressive research program in the sense 
of Lakatos, although its approach does not match with the methodological standards of the 
sciences. This tension has become evident in the rise of Behavioral Finance, which, in princi-
ple, follows the methodology of the sciences, that is, to identify regularities on the financial 
markets. Behavioral Finance was built on the anomalies of the standard model that shows up 
in its empirical tests. However, this implies that the established regularities are always de-
pendent on the standard theory that is (pace Roehner) they rarely are purely phenomenologi-
cal laws. Behavioral Finance grew with the accumulation of anomalies, which sum up to an 
impressive collection of observations on ‘irrational’ investor behavior and limits to arbitrage 
(for recent surveys, see Subrahmanyam, 2007, or van der Sar, 2004). This conceptual depend-
ency reveals that it suffers from the lack of an independent paradigm. 
 
1.2  A third methodological alternative: The naturalistic view on markets 
as systems of distributed cognition 
Behavioral Finance does not really challenge the established paradigm in the theory of fi-
nance, which is easy to understand in the context of the Lakatos approach to methodology. It 
is missing an alternative paradigm with equal theoretical consistency and logical strength as 
the fundamental theory of rationality and arbitrage. As a research program, it has not yet been 
weaned off from its dependency on the standard model, which provides the very criterion to 
define ‘anomalies’ and ‘irrationality’. So we face a dilemma, which is a challenge not only for 
theory, but also for policies, such as the need to develop the regulatory framework of capital 
markets. On the one hand, we have a powerful theory, and on the other hand we have a num-
ber of loosely connected empirical observations, which contradict the theory. Should we base 
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Recent advances in the sociology of finance have shown that this question has no simple an-
swer, because economics differs from the sciences in a substantial way. In the past, methodo-
logical discussions of economics have frequently pinpointed the tension between its norma-
tive and its positive approaches. This is evident from finance theory, too, which can also be 
interpreted as a normative theory how rational investors should behave.  
The sociology of finance has introduced a third interpretation, which is crucial for resolving 
our problem: Economics is performative (Callon, 2007). This means, as been already men-
tioned previously, that economics is endogenous to the institutional evolution of its object, the 
economic system. Economic theories contribute to the emergence, diffusion and stability of 
institutions that frame the behavior of economic agents. Thus, the controversy between Be-
havioral Finance and the pure theory misses a crucial part of the story. This is that ‘rational-
ity’ is not simply a cognitive property of agents, but an emergent property of systems of agent 
interaction.  
This sociological viewpoint matches the so-called ‘externalism’ in the  cognitive sciences, 
which highlights the role of phenomena external to the human brain to enable and organize 
human cognition (for a survey, see Wilson, 2004; see also Sterelny, 2004). In a nutshell, this 
approach implies for the study of finance that financial markets have to be analyzed as sys-
tems of distributed cognition. This approach differs from the well-known Hayekian use of the 
term of distributed knowledge, which also underlies the firmly established view on financial 
markets as information processing systems. These views interpret information processing in 
purely mentalist terms, in the sense that the notion of market efficiency does not refer to 
causal mechanisms of information processing in physical terms (leading into fundamental 
logical troubles such as the no-trade theorem, surveyed in Samuelson, 2004). In contrast, the 
externalist  notion  of  distributed  cognition  approaches  information  processing  in  terms  of 
causal connections in social networks among agents as biological entities (i.e. brains), which 
are scaffolded by technological devices both in the sense of social technologies (e.g. institu-
tions) and physical technologies (such as computers). That is, financial markets are envisaged 
as networks of peoples and things that process information in real-time (Callon et al., 2007). 
Subsequently, I wish to present some preliminary thoughts on these new developments in 
theory. I claim that the tension between Behavioral Finance and the pure theory of finance can 
only be resolved if the former is embedded into an entirely new paradigm, which combines 
the sciences with a theoretical perspective on human creativity and the endogenous emer-
gence of novelty in human systems of social interaction involving technology. The latter is 
defined in evolutionary terms, as far as conceptual tools and modeling approaches are con-
cerned. The two are synthesized in a fundamental methodological and philosophical proposi-
tion, which is ‘naturalism’ (for a survey, see Papineau, 2007). Thus, I wish to present some 
first thoughts on a naturalistic theory of finance (for more background in my own research, 
see Herrmann-Pillath 2008a, b). 
 The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of Finance 
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1.3  From the naturalistic turn to the linguistic turn 
In the context of contemporary economics, and on first sight, the term “naturalism” grasps 
phenomena such as the explanation of economic behavior by direct reference to research in 
the brain sciences, i.e. neuroeconomics, the embedding of decision theoretic models in evolu-
tionary theory, or the advance of the ‘lab’ as a new form of the social organization of eco-
nomic research.  These  changes  are coupled  with more theoretically  guided reorientations, 
such as the move from rational choice to the analysis of rule-based behavior in evolutionary 
game theory. Although these changes mainly take place with regard to the theory of behavior, 
the signs are strong that other fields of economics will also be affected, such as macroeco-
nomics (Akerlof, 2007). However, there is a conspicuous lack of philosophical references in 
the economic literature delving into the naturalistic stream. As is evident from Behavioral 
Finance, the major consequence is a lack of paradigmatic force. In particular, neuroeconomics 
is generally missing an explicit dialogue with the philosophy of mind. By mobilizing the phi-
losophical resources, I will arrive at a surprising conclusion: The naturalistic turn in econom-
ics will only be completed if it is accompanied by a linguistic turn, with a naturalistic twist. 
This  linguistic  turn  allows  unifying  Behavioral  Finance  with  neuroeconomics  on  the  one 
hand, and the sociology of finance on the other hand. So, philosophy may act as a midwife for 
the creation of a paradigmatic framework of Behavioral Finance. 
Whereas the naturalistic turn does not meet much resistance in economics, the linguistic turn 
seems to be out of reach currently. The reason is simple. The naturalistic turn clearly supports 
a further move of economics into the direction of the ‘hard’ sciences, whereas the linguistic 
turn is associated by many with postmodernism, relativism, or skepticism and hence, hetero-
dox economics of a bunch of brands (epitomized, for example, by the contributors such as 
McCloskey 1994, who reduces methodology to rhetoric). However, this association is very 
misleading and reveals a distorted reception of modern philosophy in many parts of the social 
sciences in general, and economics in particular. In fact, the naturalistic turn needs to be ac-
companied by a linguistic turn in the sense of recognizing the empirical fact that language and 
the processing of symbols are a fundamental and constitutive property of the human species. 
In economics, this turn is already manifesting first signs, which have emerged in the study of 
culture (e.g. Greif, 1994; North, 2005). Auspiciously, culture has become an empirical cate-
gory in certain areas of experimental economics (for a survey, see Bowles, 2004: 114ff.). 
Thus, orchestrating the ‘two turns’ will certainly help to systematize recent advances in eco-
nomic research. This is also important for finance, as many anomalies can be actually ref-
framed as phenomena that emerge from a certain symbolic representation of facts on capital 
markets, and because the performative role of theory essentially is a linguistic activity (actu-
ally, the term “performative” is borrowed from linguistics). 
I achieve this conceptual coordination in three steps. To avoid confusion from paying too 
much attention to the vast possibly related literature, I shall concentrate on core contributions 
that help to make the argument clear. This limitation is particularly relevant for the treatment 
of the philosophical issues, because I just develop one particular position, without putting it 
into the context of the philosophical debate. I begin with an analysis of the current state of 
neuroeconomics, brilliantly elucidated in several recent contributions by Camerer and col-
leagues. This is naturalism, mark I. Building on an early and influential model of the brain by 




Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 105 
 
ics will remain incomplete without including language as an analytical category. From this, 
the  methodological  challenge  emerges  how  to  approach  language  in  a  naturalistic  sense. 
Therefore I move on to naturalism, mark II. This has been proposed by Roy Bhaskar, among 
others, namely to follow basic explanatory schemes of the natural sciences in all human sci-
ences. The core category is causality. From this consideration the question emerges how a 
naturalistic approach to language can be meaningfully applied in economics. This is tanta-
mount  towards  a  transformation  of  hermeneutic  patterns  of  argument  into  hypothetico-
deductive explanations. This leads toward naturalism, mark III. One central philosophical 
contribution to this is John Searle’s social ontology. I argue that this approach helps to inte-
grate neuroeconomics with the study of institutions via the concept of language. I illustrate 
this point by means of a brief discussion of the ‘economics of identity’ as proposed by Aker-
lof and Kranton and ‘team preferences’ advanced by Sugden. In all steps of the argument, I 
venture at a reformulation of some recent contributions of Behavioral Finance in order to 
demonstrate that naturalism might lend paradigmatic force to its endeavor. 
 
2  Naturalism, mark I: Approaching the limits of neuroeconomics 
2.1  Economics with brains that evolved 
There are two different interpretations of neuroeconomics: One is economics as applied on 
neuroscience, one is neuroscience as applied on economics. The link between the two is the 
common use of concepts and analytical tools mainly developed in economics and decision 
theory. It comes at a surprise that the former interpretation is often maintained by neuroscien-
tists (as a representative, take Glimcher, 2003), the second by economists (as a representative, 
take Camerer, 2007).  
This apparently strange combination occurs because in economics the use of neuroscience 
emerged out of experimental and behavioral economics, and thus was propelled by the ongo-
ing research on anomalies of rational choice and on the specific behavioral patterns in strate-
gic interaction (the former is surveyed in Camerer, 2003; for a seminal statement of the latter 
research tradition, see Thaler, 1994). Thus, neuroeconomics is part and parcel of what I have 
described as a naturalistic turn in terms of a switch to natural science style of experimental 
research and the physical move of economists from the armchair to the lab. It is driven by the 
availability of experimental methods of neuroscience which allow opening up the ‘black box’ 
of the brain and directly observing neurophysiological causation in human behavior. To sum-
marize the foundations of human behavior as derived from this approach (following Camerer 
et al., 2005, or Park and Zak, 2007), we can safely state:  
•  The human brain is weakly modular, which means that there are functionally specific 
procedural patterns, which are not coordinated by a central agency but under special 
conditions. The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of Finance 
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•  There  is  a  fundamental  interaction  between  cognitive  and  affective  dimensions  of 
brain activity, and in particular, the human capability to evaluate environmental states 
is rooted in emotions. 
•  There is a second fundamental interaction between processes which are reflected in 
consciousness, and those which are not. 
•  Human decisions are not the outcome of a unified and coherent decision calculus, but 
result from the interaction of different subsystems of the brain competing for behav-
ioral control, sometimes reflected in conscious struggles over decisions. 
•  There are cortical areas which are designed to imagine the other, and to ascribe con-
sciousness to others. 
This state of the art in the brain sciences clearly poses a principled challenge at the standard 
notion of economic rationality, because this starts out from the notion of a ‘general purpose 
rationality’, which displays certain systemic features such as logical consistency, and which 
applies domain-independent. The view of the brain sciences receives strong support by evolu-
tionary psychology, which can explain facts such as the modularization of the brain as the 
outcome of the evolutionary history of the human species (Tooby and Cosmides, 2005). Thus, 
there is the clear opportunity to relate behavioral economics and finance, neuroeconomics, 
and Darwinian Theory within an evolutionary approach to human decision making (for an 
earlier  attempt,  see  Herrmann-Pillath,  1994;  compare  Elworthy’s  (1993)  notion  of  Homo 
Biologicus). 
Based on these fundamental notions, it is relatively straightforward to explain many facts of 
experimental economics and Behavioral Finance in terms of results of the brain sciences, sup-
ported by the application of diagnostic and empirical methods of the latter. For example, we 
have neuroeconomic evidence for hyperbolic discounting, which implies that there is a bias to 
immediate gratification in human choice (McClure et al., 2007). This vindicated earlier theo-
ries about multiple selves competing for behavioral control (Elster, 1986; Ainslie, 1992). Stra-
tegic interaction is crucially determined by specific determinants of imaging the other and 
developing trust, which in turn depend on environmental triggers of certain hormonal reac-
tions. There is clear neuroscientific evidence for specific weightings of probabilities (much 
discussed in the literature on anomalies, triggered by Kahneman’s contributions, summarized 
in Kahnemann, 2003). Or, reward mechanisms include money as an independent determinant 
of satisfaction. There are straightforward ways to relate these insights to empirical phenomena 
in money and finance, such as in the seminal study by Laibson (1997) on the implications of 
hyperbolic discounting on savings behavior and credit card uses. 
This list of evidence is certainly biased, as it focuses on the deviations from standard concep-
tions  of  the  economic  model  of  rational  choice.  Therefore  it  needs  emphasis  that  neu-
roeconomics also provides strong support for established conceptions of rationality, in par-
ticular Bayesian rationality. This evidence mainly relates to single behavioral mechanisms 
and is firmly founded in a broad range of biological applications of economics in general (a 
classic is Kagel et al. 1995). From this observation a crucial general insight emerges. Standard 
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versal mechanisms of behavior, whereas the behavior on the integrated level is determined by 
much  more  complex  interactions  of  mechanisms,  which  cannot  satisfactorily  fit  into  the 
mould of the standard conception of Bayesian optimization (Ross, 2005: 250ff., 345ff.). This 
is why experimental economics has accumulated a long and impressive list of anomalies of 
rationality in human behavior. However, it is very important to note that this distinction is not 
directly related to consciousness, that is, various conscious choices may fit or may not fit to 
standard rationality, depending on context. Vice versa, there is no necessary connection be-
tween unconscious behavior and ‘irrational’ behavior. Quite the other way round, from an 
evolutionary perspective there are strong reasons to assume that precisely the easier, auto-
matic decision procedures might have approached a state of optimality, whereas the more 
complex procedures might display a correspondingly complex dynamics which cannot be fit 
into the mould of rational optimization.  
I now wish to raise the question whether or not this approach implies that human decision 
making might be eventually reduced to neuroscientific facts. This question might be perceived 
to build a strawman, as few economists would really adopt a fully reductionist approach. But 
still,  neuroeconomics  cannot  simply  leave  the  question  in  the  dark,  whether  or  not  neu-
roeconomic research would suffice at some later time to explain economic behavior (thus fi-
nally substituting the standard utility theory), and if not, what else we will need. There is a 
strong argument against the relevance of neuroeconomics which has been presented by Gul 
and Pesendorfer (2005), the “case for mindless” economics. In principle, this is the argument 
that rationality is not a property of agents, but of economic systems, such that neuroeconom-
ics commits a categorical confusion.  
 
2.2  The essential incompleteness of human brains 
The Gul and Pesendorfer argument concentrates on the equilibrium approach in economics 
and is close to standard ‘money pump’ arguments which state that irrational behavior cannot 
persist in a competitive market because it will open up arbitrage opportunities, such that even-
tually irrational agents will be driven out of the market. This argument is also well known 
from the finance context. 
Following the thoughts presented in the first section, I do not pursue this argument further, 
because it relies on the standard economic methodology. Once it is accepted as the bench-
mark, the argument holds, in principle. However, it does not result into a causal theory, be-
cause it directly replicates the logical problems with the arbitrage argument of the correspond-
ing notion of rationality which is treated as an equilibrium phenomenon. Therefore, I accept 
the fundamental point that rationality might be a systemic property, not a property of agents, 
but I open up another possible interpretation (for an early institutionalist argument in the same 
vein,  see  Frey  and  Eichenberger,  1989).  This  interpretation  asks  for  the  medium  through 
which causal connectedness among brains can emerge at all, which might then underlie the 
emergence of systemic properties of cognition. I posit that this medium is language. 
The  main  argument  on  this  has  already  been  presented  by  brain  scientist  Gary  Edelman 
(1987) twenty years ago (for a recent statement of his views, see Edelman, 2006). Edelman The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of Finance 
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has developed a special neuroscientific model of the brain which he dubbed “neural darwin-
ism” (for a summary, see Edelman and Tonioni, 1995). This peculiar model does not affect 
the interpretation of neuroeconomic results, as it is operating on a more foundational level of 
brain research. Anyway, it fits the main conceptual building blocks of neuroeconomics that I 
identified above, in particular the notions of weak modularity and of competing processes for 
behavioral  control.  As  an  important  footnote  to  intellectual  history,  it  is  remarkable  that 
Edelman’s model is very close to Hayek’s (1952) model of the ‘Sensory Order’ which antici-
pated  the  fundamental  modern  paradigm  of  neuronal  connectionism  developed  by  Hebb 
(Steele, 2002), and which provides the epistemological pillar on which the Hayekian vision of 
economics rests. 
One of the crucial questions of these approaches is how to explain the human capability of 
categorization by means of fluid and complex neuronal interactions. Note that categorization 
underlies  all  neuroeconomic  experiments  in the sense  that  behavior  is  matched  to  certain 
‘definitions of the situation’, namely the categorization of current states and the elicitation of 
the appropriate behavioral patterns, which might in turn be reflected upon by means of higher 
level cognitive mechanisms of categorization. Categorization is the basic element in Edel-
man’s neuronal theory of learning (as well as Hayek’s). For example, in the context of finance 
categorization takes place when certain states of the markets and the implied prices of stocks 
are implicitly treated as ‘reference points’.  
Now, Edelman (1987: 308ff.) argues that neuronal processes alone can never end up in an 
adaptively functional system of categorization because they remain solipsistic (basically, this 
is a neuroscience version of Wittgenstein’s famous argument against the possibility of a pri-
vate language, see Candlish, 2007). The only way how categorization can become fixed in a 
neuronal system is via communication systems. Thus, Edelman arrives at an interactive model 
between genetic evolution and neuronal development in the sense that evolution supports the 
emergence of the capability of communicative information processing, which in turn provides 
the basis for the capacity of adaptively positive categorizations in neuronal systems. In case of 
the  human  species,  this  implies  that  the  capacity  for  language,  language  and  neuro-
mechanisms should be inextricably related in an evolutionary process (for a more recent view 
on this, see Millikan, 2005). Thus, Edelman proposed an externalist approach to brain re-
search in the sense that the neurofoundations of the cognitive capacities of humans can only 
be identified by means of analyzing systems of brains, not single brains. This precisely re-
flects the transition from the individual to the system in Gut and Pesendorfer’s argument 
against neuroeconomics. 
 
2.3  Language and the unity of the brain 
From the perspective of economic methodology, a similar conclusion has been reached by 
economists and philosopher Don Ross recently, mainly reflecting upon the results of neu-
roeconomics as summarized above.  
Ross (2005) picks up threads of arguments that have been fore mostly developed by Daniel 
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ades, Dennett has elaborated extensively on a naturalistic theory of mind, which explains con-
sciousness as a result of complex and dynamic neuronal processes (in particular, Dennett 
1991). His main target of criticism is the so-called Cartesian theatre, i.e. the belief that there is 
‘someone’ (the ‘homunculus’) in the brain who actually perceives images, choices or memo-
ries,  and  proceeds  with  processing  these  to  arrive  at  certain  actions.  In  our  context,  this 
closely fits the standard ‘as if’ construction in economics, which assumes that choices are 
represented to a decision maker who selects the optimum. Instead of this, Dennett has pro-
posed the ‘multiple drafts’ model of consciousness, which is very similar to Edelman’s con-
ception of competing processes and mutual mappings in the brain. Another similarity with 
Edelman is the explanation of consciousness and the self as a ‘narrative’, which explicitly 
links up language with the continuous construction of identities. This role of language is theo-
retically founded in the concept of ‘memes’, which we do not need to investigate further here 
(see Dennett, 1995: Chapter 12; for a fully-fledged theory of meme-based communication 
among brains, see Aunger, 2002). 
Against this background, the main point put forward by Ross is that language is the only way 
how the fragmented and fluid nature of the brain can be cast into the mould of a mind and 
self. He summarizes a great deal of psychological and economic literature to state that the 
only conclusion can be (Ross 2005: 186) that “people are politically complex societies of 
temporally located selves.” This ends up in radically deconstructing any idea of a coherent 
‘individual’ for guiding analysis into behavior, in the sense of standard methodological indi-
vidualism. But where does observed stability of agents come from, then (Ross, 2005: 286 ff., 
351ff.)? It stems from the constraints on variability that emerge from the linguistic and social 
construction of selves in the course of the history of interactions among biological individu-
als, in the sense of the self being a narrative structure, out of which, among other phenomena, 
consciousness emerges (see also Ross, 2007). This construction can by no means be anchored 
in some autonomous rational design, but emerges from an evolutionary process, both on the 
biological and on the social level. Because of the widely diverging time frames on the differ-
ent levels of evolution, evolution in the symbolic realm matters much more than biological 
evolution (for a general Darwinian framework, see Jablonka and Lamb, 2005). Thus, the very 
notion of an economic agent is fundamentally embedded into the phenomenon of language. 
Ross’s argument fits precisely into the fundamental insights of the analysis of framing in be-
havioral economics. This is where the crucial linkage between language and neuroeconomics 
is moving to the center stage of analysis. For example, there is a clear triggering role of dif-
ferent linguistic representations of the same decision problems (viewed from the formal per-
spective and with regard to the outcome), as far as the relative balance between affects and 
cognition is concerned. In the famous Trolley Dilemma people will end up in different moral 
judgments, when the same outcome is related with different scenario involving direct or indi-
rect action (in this case, sacrificing a human life for a number of others either by indirectly 
causing a physical mechanism that ends up with this result, or by directly killing the person) 
(see Cohen, 2005). A resounding proof of the prime importance of language for economic 
methodology is the increasing use of ‘vignettes’, i.e. fine-tuned linguistic representations of 
imagined social contexts and constellations of choice and judgment, as an empirical alterna-
tive to extensive surveys or experimental tests (e.g. when investigating into notions of fair-
ness, see Konow, 2003, or on risk, as in the classical experiments by Kahnemann and Tver-
sky, see Kahnemann, 2003). The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of Finance 
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The implications for Behavioral Finance are at hand. Behavioral Finance cannot be founded 
on neuroeconomics alone. There is the fundamental problem of the causal incompleteness and 
indeterminacy of brain processes. Neuroeconomics can only turn into a relevant foundation 
for Behavioral Finance if it starts to consider systems of brains, which are systems of commu-
nication mainly based on language (but also other symbolic media, such as body language on 
physical trading floors). Behavioral Finance needs a linguistic turn, precisely if it realizes a 
naturalistic turn. 
2.4  Implications for the theory of finance 
The significance of this methodological step becomes evident if we consider the standard 
foundation of Behavioral Finance in psychology. Psychology consists of systematizations of 
empirical regularities in human behavior, such as in prospect theory, which states a relation 
between reference points and asymmetric valuations of losses and gains. This corresponds to 
the neuroeconomic perspective as those regularities are seen as being rooted in individual 
behavior.  The  linguistic  turn  implies  that  research  needs  to  concentrate  on  the  way  how 
frames, reference points, and other forms of categorization emerge from the communicative 
interaction among agents. Cases in point are the central categories in finance theory, namely 
the  constructs  of  expectations  and  risk.  Pure  theory  treats  these  as  mathematical  entities, 
whereas a linguistic approach would ask for the specific symbolic frames of expectations and 
risks that underlie the cognitive processes on capital markets. These frames are the medium of 
distributed  cognition.  Psychology  and  the  underlying  neurophysiological  mechanisms  can 
only explain the link between frames and actions, but do not suffice to explain the action 
alone.  
A good example for this research perspective is Ehrig and Kauffman’s (2007) analysis of 
framing in the work of analysts, which result into risk assessments. They are especially evi-
dent in the case of newly emerging business models, when analysts need to sort them into 
established categories in order to make them comparable. Thus, when Amazon entered the 
market, it made a substantial difference for risk assessments whether it was treated as a book-
seller or a dot.com company. This role of frames for defining industries and classifying com-
panies is well known from organizational demography (see Carroll and Hannan, 2000), but 
seems so far neglected in finance. 
Interestingly, this approach is directly relevant also for the pure theory of finance and the way 
how it deals with the results of Behavioral Finance. The starting point is the fact that the two 
pivotal theoretical propositions in the pure theory of finance, the CAPM and the efficient mar-
ket hypothesis, cannot be tested independently from each other (Fama, 1991). In order to 
check for abnormal returns, the CAPM establishes the benchmark for the normal returns and 
allows deducing estimates for expectations. On the other hand, the CAPM refers to the notion 
of a ‘market portfolio’ which requires a statistical delimitation of the relevant market. Theo-
retically, this is the portfolio of all risky assets, thus including assets far beyond the scope of 
the capital market in the narrow meaning. At the same time, however, it is the very notion of 
market efficiency in the sense of fungibility in arbitrage that determines the scope of that 
theoretical portfolio. This peculiar constellation between the two theories means that the mod-
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ence, that is, there is no way to empirically refute single elements of the theories, but only an 
‘either-or’ of complete rejection or complete renunciation. 
Precisely this interaction between theory and observational language (which is nothing special 
in advanced scientific theories, see Stegmüller, 1986) points towards the role of language as a 
neglected category in the theory of finance. This is because the degrees of freedom in the the-
ory allow for an essential role of the cognitive construction of the markets, and in particular, 
the endogenous function of finance theory in this construction. Language is essentially in-
volved in the ways how markets are constructed and risks are categorized and perceived. This 
includes scientific categorizations, such as in the case of the alternative assumptions about the 
underlying  statistical  distributions  (normal  distribution  versus  Levy,  for  example).  Thus, 
Fama and French have shown in a seminal series of articles (e.g. Fama and French 1993) that 
standard anomalies of Behavioral Finance such as the impact of book-market values and size 
on returns could be explained as a compensation for ‘distress risk’, thus actually fitting into 
the established model. 
The Fama and French argument is intriguing because it raises the question how far the con-
ceptualizations of risk in the theory are reflected in the conceptualizations of risk that are in-
volved in the practices of the finance industry, and to which extent these conceptualizations 
need to converge in order to lend empirical validity to the theory. This clearly was the case in 
the first decades of the CAPM, when precisely the diffusion of the CAPM and the fixation of 
traders’ behavior on the betas contributed to a better fit between model and reality (in detail, 
MacKenzie 2006). But the same argument applies for the Fama and French approach. All 
categories used in the empirical tests can be also the conceptualizations of risk that guide the 
behavior of agents on the financial markets. If that were true, we end up in reconciliation be-
tween Behavioral Finance and pure theory. The market risk is only secondary to the framing 
of conceptions of risk. As Statman (1999) has it, this implies that ‘market efficiency’ in the 
sense of the theoretical rationality criterion is either false or futile, whereas the proposition 
that nobody can beat the market still holds. 
However, such kind of direct convergence between theoretical categorizations and factual 
framing does not seem to be a necessary condition. The case in point is the resilience of tech-
nical analysis in the practices of the financial business. Technical analysis projects an entirely 
different linguistic scheme on the interpretation of market data than mainstream finance the-
ory. As Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) have shown recently for the case of forex markets, it is 
extremely difficult to prove that technical analysis is wrong in the sense that forex traders 
using technical analysis rely on a wrong theory that would show up as ‘irrational’ behavior in 
terms of the pure theory. That means, there is the possibility that a wrong theory might guide 
the right decisions. This observation highlights the need to investigate into the specific com-
municative means and symbolic representations that actually underlie the abstract notion of 
information processing on markets. This amounts to a causal analysis of financial markets, as 
compared to the theoretical concept of arbitrage. Thus, a reconciliation of Behavioral Finance 
and the pure theory is possible if both are embedded into a causal model that rests upon lan-
guage. This methodological difference leads us to the second interpretation of naturalism. 
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3  Naturalism, mark II: The naturalistic approach to causation in human 
behavior and interaction 
3.1  Towards a unified conception of causality in the sciences, the social sci-
ences, and the humanities 
It can be fairly stated that, conventionally, language analysis and naturalism would seem to be 
methodological antipodes. That might not be true for the explanation of the human capacity 
for language, but certainly for specific functions and uses of language, which rely on central 
aspects of language such as meaning and reference. Understanding a poem seems to be a far 
cry from naturalism. We have already mentioned in the initial section, that this is the main 
reason why a linguistic turn is avoided in economics. Economists feel deep suspicions about 
the application of hermeneutic methods, which seem to lead into the trap of analytic arbitrari-
ness and relativism. 
However, this attitude is not warranted, as there are naturalistic approaches to language based 
on the claim that naturalism has to be fore mostly understood as a particular methodological 
stance (in language theory, this has culminated in the so-called ‘teleosemantic’ approach, see 
Macdonald and Papineau, 2006). This is to adopt a view of explanation and causality that fol-
lows the natural sciences.  
To get this point clear, it is of utmost importance to distinguish between models of explana-
tions and reductionism. Naturalism mark II does not imply reductionism, but does imply that 
there are universal patterns of scientific explanation that apply for both the natural and the 
social sciences or the humanities. These happened to emerge mainly in the natural sciences, 
but this does not mean that the theories generated in their domain become the exclusive means 
of explanation. 
One approach to naturalism in this sense has been proposed by Bhaskar’s (1987) version of 
‘transcendental realism’. Bhaskar argues that the main difference between the natural and the 
social sciences does not lie in the methodology, but in that the former mainly refers to closed 
systems and the latter to open systems. The core concept unifying both domains is causality. 
Resembling approaches  to causality developed  by philosophers such as Nancy Cartwright 
(1989), Bhaskar (1987: 18ff.) argues that the notion of a ‘causal power’ is central to any sci-
entific explanation. This notion is an ontological one, which means that analyzing causality 
ends up with the identification of structures of reality that generate the observed phenomena 
(for example, a frame can be such a structure with causal power). These structures enrich on-
tology in the sense of the identification of elements of reality that are not directly observable. 
Thus, the social sciences identify ‘real things’ in explaining social phenomena, just as the 
physicists discover elementary particles. What are these things? 
Mantzavinos (2006) (without referring to Bhaskar) has recently developed a more detailed, 
related view that explicitly deals with the core concept that might stand in the way of a natu-
ralistic approach to the social sciences, namely hermeneutics. His argument is that every sup-
posedly hermeneutical analysis can be reformulated according to the basic model of the sci-
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Mantzavinos argues that every nexus of meaning can be transformed into a causal nexus if 
invariance can be identified across different nexi which are related to same referents, such as 
the same persons. The invariance attains the methodological status of a law-like statement, 
such that the hypothetico-deductive pattern of explanation applies. For example, in using the 
expressions of a language we can identify invariants in terms of certain mental states which 
are intentions to express a certain meaning. A linguistic law-like statement can be constructed 
if invariant intentions under similar circumstances have always led to the same utterance. In 
this case, the intentions assume the role of causes, so that there is no need to refer to a special 
category of actions supposedly transcending causality (needless to say, there is a plethora of 
deep philosophical issues behind this use of the concept of intentions, for a survey, see Jacob, 
2003).  
Bhaskar would reject this reference to the hypothetico-deductive model, as he argues that 
there are no time-invariant regularities in open systems (Bhaskar, 1987: 128ff.), but apart 
from this the basic point is the same: The hermeneutic approach is superseded by a causal 
explanation which refers to structural determinants such as intentions. This is precisely the 
same point as has been made by Bhaskar (1987: 90ff.) regarding reasons as causes. Bhaskar 
has a very simple, almost naïve, yet convincing argument here (again, I should be fair in not-
ing  that  there  are  tough  philosophical  quarrels  over  the  issue  of  mental  causation,  see 
Robb/Heil, 2005): How can it be that a linguistic utterance of A leads to an action of B? The 
only way is to assume that the utterance causes a change in B’s state of mind, which then 
causes the action. In B’s linguistic reflection, the utterance may be regarded as a ‘reason’ in 
the teleological sense, but in fact the reason becomes only effective because it ultimately re-
fers to a state of mind. Thus, a ‘reason’ is just a linguistic representation of the real causal 
processes in which symbolic patterns attain the role of causes mediated through mental states. 
It is interesting to note that from this perspective the standard conception of rational choice in 
economics does not count as a causal explanation, but merely a rational reconstruction of ac-
tion (Mantzavinos, 2006: 97ff.). This is because the utility function cannot be stated as invari-
ance, i.e. the maximization hypothesis remains a tautological statement. In this sense, standard 
economics is hermeneutics in disguise of mathematics. This is precisely why the move to neu-
roeconomics may attain a foundational status in economics, because only neuroeconomics can 
turn  even  the  standard  approach  into  an  explanation  following  the  hypothetico-deductive 
method, with the mental states qua states of the brain becoming observable invariants, such 
that causal analysis can apply. 
 
3.2  Gestalt theory and emotions as framed affects 
How can we apply these arguments on the main result of the previous section, namely that 
neuroeconomics needs to be necessarily supplemented by the analysis of language? The sim-
ple point is that neuronal processes are only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for 
eliciting a behavior. A clear proof of this is the lack of an unequivocal neuronal determinism, 
i.e. the mapping between behavior and the brain is flexible and multivalued. The sufficient 
condition is the causal connection between symbolic representations and a neuronal process. 
For example, symbolic representations may be conceived as higher level constraints on neu-The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of Finance 
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ronal activity which result from activating stable structural patterns of neuronal interaction 
(for a related view, see Calvin, 1998). However, this explanation would only end up in a ’sol-
ipsistic’ model again in the sense of Edelman’s, if we did not accept language to be an emer-
gent level of independent causal power, which cannot be entirely reduced to a neuronal fact. 
After all, what arrives at receiver B’s brain is not a neuronal impulse, but an utterance trans-
mitted via sound waves (compare Aunger, 2002). In other words, any attempt at reducing lan-
guage to pure neuronal phenomena will drive the model into the trap of infinite regress (on 
this, see already Hayek, 1952: Chapter 8). Thus, language is considered as supervening on 
neuronal processes. This is precisely to accept meanings as causes.  
One way to understand these causal forces in economics has been shown by Kubon-Gilke 
(1997) and Schlicht (1998) who introduced Gestalt theory into the analysis of institutions. 
Gestalt theory is a psychological approach that assigns specific causal mechanisms to cogni-
tion that root in certain tendencies to complement imperfect perceptions and conceptual con-
structs. It starts off with the assumption of a fundamental correspondence between the brain 
and cognitive processes and posits that the brain generates regularities from sensory inputs, 
based on certain fundamental rules or cognitive laws, which  all relate to the principle of 
Prägnanz (translated by Schlicht as “clarity”, by other authors as “conciseness”). Prägnanz 
means that there are different mechanisms by which the mind completes incomplete sensory 
inputs to coherent and meaningful wholes. In particular, cognition tends to build collectives 
from single observations. For example, the “Law of Proximity” implies that individuals tend 
to see things that are spatially close as totalities, or the “Law of Continuity” implies that cog-
nition tends to extrapolate movements etc.  
The Gestalt theoretic approach complements the linguistic turn because it provides a concep-
tual bridge between the notion of symbolic representations and brain processes. The relation 
between a symbolic representation and its referent is always fuzzy and leaves many possibili-
ties  of  interpretation  open.  Perception  provides  hints  at  completing  those  fragmented  and 
fuzzy relations into categories that ultimately impose patterns of perception on the brain that 
do not directly reflect ‘reality’. The most famous examples for this are the cognitive biases in 
visual perception, in which incomplete pictures are complemented automatically by the brain, 
switching between different interpretations, depending on the context into which the frag-
ments are put. Thus, symbolic representations obtain causal power on actions, mediated via 
brain processes which reflect the workings of fundamental Gestalt theoretic laws. 
Clearly, Schlicht’s notion of Gestalt is akin to the concept of frame, which implies that Ge-
stalt theory can undergird the economic approach to framing with a theory about causation. 
This is particularly important for integrating another important concept in neuroeconomics, 
namely the role of affects and emotions. As I have mentioned in the previous section, brain 
research clearly shows that all human decisions are based on an interaction between a cogni-
tive and an affectual subsystem. Further, following Damasio’s (1995) seminal contributions, 
the crucial input to decisions, namely valuation, is based on affects (‘emotional markers’). 
Now, Tooby and Cosmides (2005), in their systematic approach to evolutionary psychology, 
argue  that  emotions  are  the  unifying  mechanisms  in  the  modularized  human  brain.  That 
means they establish a bridge between the effectual and the cognitive modes of the brain, be-
cause emotions can be defined as ‘framed affects’. Affects can be classified into human uni-
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contexts that are categorized cognitively. Thus, sadness is a universal human affect, but its 
expression differs across cultures and is related with certain contexts, in which everybody 
expects sadness to occur. 
From this follows that Gestalt theory is central for economic analysis for two reasons. Firstly, 
Gestalt theory identifies a special form of categorization based on induction, which follows 
the laws of Prägnanz. It can provide a causal analytics for the explanation of the cognitive 
processing of economic data, especially in uncertain environments, where sensory inputs are 
fragmented and chaotic. This is an alternative to axiomatically based theories of risk. Sec-
ondly, Gestalt theory may provide a more detailed view on the dynamics of the interaction 
between cognitive and effectual modes of the brain, which translates into the empirical strat-
egy to analyze the role of emotions in economic behavior. We can even submit the strong 
proposition that causation in economics depends crucially on emotions as causal intermediar-
ies.  
 
3.3  Implications for the theory of finance 
Emotional factors are frequently alluded to in popular comments on the financial markets, 
such as when invoking ‘greed’ as a cause of the recent crisis. The approach sketched above 
allows for a more differentiated view on emotions. I give two examples. 
The question what role money actually plays in the economy has been rarely investigated em-
pirically by economists, in the sense of its causal effects. This is because money has been ex-
cluded from the list of goods that carry utility and assigned to the role of a mere medium of 
exchange. However, in recent brain research it could be proven that money is a primary rein-
forcer, comparable in its neurophysiological effects with stimuli such as food and sex (for a 
brief report, see Camerer et al., 2005: 35f; for a broader biological, psychological and socio-
logical perspective, see Lea and Webley, 2005). Thus, money appears to be related with fun-
damental effectual structures in the human brain. However, this clearly does not directly allow 
for the identification of ‘money’, as money is not a simple given, such as the nutrients of 
food, but is a pure social construct. In this regard, behavioral economics research could show 
that money is simply cash, in the sense that other forms of money, such as substitutes in the 
shape of frequent-traveler miles, are treated differently. Interestingly, these results can explain 
an important insight by research into Behavioral Finance, namely that investors treat capital 
gains differently from cash gains, i.e. dividend payments. In the context of applications of 
prospect theory, it has been shown that cash payments move reference points, whereas capital 
gains leave them unaffected. If money is a primary reinforcer, this result is entirely plausible. 
Thus, a common conceptual tool in Behavioral Finance, mental accounts, can be directly re-
lated with neuroeconomic phenomena, while being a case of framing at the same time. 
Another topic in Behavioral Finance, which has also received strong attention in anthropo-
logical research on financial markets, is the role of direct physical communication among 
traders, and in this context also the gender dimension in the finance business. Regarding the 
latter, Barber and Odean (2001) have produced evidence that male investors show a higher 
level of overconfidence than female investors, which they explain by an evolutionary psy-The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of Finance 
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chology argument on the neurophysiological differentiation between the sexes during human 
phylogeny. Needless to say, that this argument faces considerable criticism by sociological 
theories about gender versus sex. However, the sociological perspective might even lend fur-
ther support to the general thrust of the argument presented by Barber and Odean, because 
there is ample evidence that the practice of the business of finance is highly loaded by gen-
dered linguistic performances and by habits of male groups. For example, the vernacular of 
financial traders is marked by sexist expressions, which give a sexual meaning to trading 
prowess and success (for examples and analysis, see Hassoun, 2005). Thus, overconfidence 
might be explained as the result of an interaction between neurophysiological dispositions and 
symbolic representations in the social context.  
Indeed, the highly abstract approach of the modern theory of finance simply distorts our view 
of the actual process of trading in financial markets. As recent anthropological research has 
shown, the gender dimension of financial markets should not simply be viewed in terms of 
political concerns about gender discrimination,  but actually touches on more  fundamental 
aspects of human social organization. The neutralized notion of risk in the pure theory blocks 
the view on the fact that trading is a highly intensive emotional experience, and that risk tak-
ing is a process that encompasses the entire spectrum of bodily experiences, especially in trad-
ing pits where traders gather collectively (Zaloom, 2004). In these contexts, the abstract no-
tion of information processing on markets corresponds to a dense and intensive interaction 
among physically close, mostly male individuals, who have to use all means to signal their 
engagement of risk taking, and who have to decode emotional signals sent by others. Tacit 
knowledge accumulated in long years of trading experience is crucial for managing the inex-
tricable interplay between emotions and cognition. 
Clearly, there is a technologically induced change of the context of trading, often explicitly 
linked to the expectation that the seemingly ‘irrational’ aspects of trading might be substituted 
by the neutral automaticism of computer programs. Yet, this does not necessarily imply that 
emotions cannot be processed electronically. Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger (2002) have pro-
duced much evidence that even in the most ideal-typical market, the global forex market, ac-
tual transactions are embedded into what they call ‘global microstructures’. In these micro-
structures emotional markers are communicated with great speed and efficiency via computer 
communication, without any spatial contiguity. The screen becomes a central stage for the 
display and signaling of emotions, and seems to be an excellent example for the externaliza-
tion of brain processes, which, in terms of Knorr Cetina’s and Bruegger’s sociological ap-
proach, are treated as intense forms of intersubjectivity. 
One can even argue the other way round, namely that it is the markets themselves which re-
currently reconstitute the role of emotions, albeit in a new symbolic frame (following Frank, 
1988). This is because actual trading activity can lock up traders in situations of strategic in-
teraction, which formally corresponds to the chain-store paradox and related games where 
‘irrational’ aggression might deter other agents, such that in the end the ‘irrational’ strategy 
turns out to be the more successful one. For example, DeLong et al. (1991) argue that over-
confident traders, who act aggressively, might end up with bearing more risk and hence, with 
higher expected returns. In fact, in the social organization of trading pits there is a clear status 
hierarchy of traders, which reflects their relative trading volumes (their ‘sizes’, with sexual 
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presence, but can be reconstructed in the electronic trading places, where groups of traders 
develop identities and forge strategies against each others, such as in the competitive relations 
between traders at different financial centers (Zaloom, 2003). 
Statman (1999) confronts the “rational-utilitarian” approach of the pure theory of finance with 
the “value-expressive” approach of Behavioral Finance. I think that this distinction neatly fits 
into my naturalistic reconstruction. To complete this, we need to turn to naturalism, mark III, 
which allows putting Statman’s notion of “value-expressive” action into a broader philoso-
phical context. 
 
4  Naturalism, mark III: Language and social ontology 
4.1  Social ontology 
Our argument now closes a circle. How can we interpret the fact that in different cultures, 
even as simple forms of social interaction as the ultimatum games are played in a significantly 
different fashion (Henrich, 2000; Bowles, 2004: 114ff.)? The only way is to introduce frames, 
that is, the same game structure is given a different meaning in different cultures (Gintis, 
2006). Following the methodological stance developed in the previous section, this implies 
that the frame is assigned causal power in the explanation. The frame establishes the invari-
ance needed to turn the rational choice model of game theory into an empirically meaningful 
theory. 
John Searle (1995; 2004a) has developed a naturalistic approach to language and social inter-
action which extends this point to the notion of a social ontology (I should fairly note that 
there is a considerable tension between Searle’s notion of naturalism and “antianthropocen-
tric” versions, which have so far dominated my argument, see Ross, 2005: 18ff.). The crucial 
conceptual device is the distinction between observer-independent and observer-relative facts. 
For example, a physical phenomenon like a rock exists independently of an observer, whereas 
money as an institution exists only with reference to an observer. This is the same as stating 
that money has a meaning, and only exists by that meaning, whereas the rock is a rock inde-
pendent of a possible assignment of meaning by an observer. Still, both money and the rock 
cause something in the context of processes. They are facts of reality. This distinction is very 
useful to systematize research in neuroeconomics and behavioral economics. Neuronal proc-
esses  are  observer-independent  facts;  frames  are  observer-relative  facts.  Applied  neu-
roeconomics would explain observed behavior as the conjunction of observer-independent 
and observer-relative causes. 
The relevance of this conceptual distinction becomes evident when we consider Searle’s ex-
planation of a social institution. Institutions are complex phenomena, and in the context of 
this paper we do not need to proceed in a comprehensive fashion. The core notion is the for-
mula “X counts as Y in context C”. Searle argues that institutions ultimately rest on chains of 
transfers of meanings that follow this formula. For example, fiat money can be created by 
stating the pertinent “count as” relation. However, this certainly is not sufficient to establish The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of Finance 
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the institution of money. Ultimately, this institution goes back to some fundamental physical 
relations between agents, such as in the punishments against counterfeiters. The “count as” 
formula is infinitely productive, because it can always be applied on itself.  
The “count as” formula is essentially dependent on language, because it is a transfer of mean-
ing through the manipulation of symbols. Its activation happens through collective intention-
ality, which is in turn a linguistically mediated phenomenon. An institution is based on a 
“count as” relation that is valid for us, and not only for me. This “us” (see below) is only con-
stituted by linguistic reference to the collective. Behind this relation, there is a set of what 
Searle calls “deontic powers”. Language is a major vehicle to express and activate deontic 
powers, and at the same time it depends on deontic powers (Searle, 2006). One of the most 
fundamental  aspects  are  certain  rules  of  speaking,  such  as  that  normally  we  assume  that 
somebody means what he/she says. Meanings are also obligations in the sense that everybody 
normally expects that I adhere to a meaning commonly agreed upon. Based on this, language 
enables me, for example, to express commitments in a collective, such as making promises. 
As Demichelis and Weibull (2008) have shown recently, this functioning of language can 
change many established propositions in economics, especially in the context of game theory, 
which up to know tended to neutralize language as ‘cheap talk’ (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). 
There would be much more to say, of course, on Searle’s approach (for a concise summary 
directed at economists, see Searle, 2005). But in the current context, we are only interested in 
the narrow issue, how can we relate the Searle approach to economics, in particular including 
the neuroeconomic dimension? Firstly, Searle adheres to a non-reductionist naturalist theory 
of mind. In this regard, there is a clear antagonism to Dennett, which is most evident in the 
“Chinese room” thought experiment, in which Searle attempts at demonstrating that neuronal 
connectionism cannot be a model for both brain-mind monism or Artificial Intelligence (in the 
strong version), which Dennett claims to be possible (for a survey on this, see Cole, 2004). In 
my treatment of the issue, this echoes Edelman’s argument that neuronal processes remain 
incomplete in explaining information processing in the brain. That means neuroeconomics 
without an explicit analysis of meaning remains an incomplete endeavor. Secondly, Searle 
gives a very straightforward account of consciousness, which in turn has to play a central role 
in any economic conception of an agent. This is that consciousness is an observer-relative 
fact. As a fact, consciousness can be a cause of action. 
From this viewpoint, it is easy to deal with the cultural frames in the aforementioned experi-
ments with ultimatum games. Economists normally assume that rational actors perceive the 
structure of a game and in particular, the pay-offs, in the same way. This is wrong, as a game 
is an institution, and thus it always has to be seen as being a part of a “count as” relation. 
Thus, “sharing” is a word which can have very different meanings, dependent on its use in 
different institutional settings and ways of life. A game is always a language game (in the 
sense of Wittgenstein’s, 1958; compare a similar view in Ross, 2005: Chapter 7). This neces-
sarily translates into the behavior in ultimatum games, which “count as” something different 
in different cultures, such that the meaning of “sharing” is simply not the same. The game and 
the pay-offs are observer-dependent facts, which in turn are dependent on the use of a particu-
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Thus, Searle provides another element of a causal theory of economic behavior that fits the 
Gestalt theoretic argument of the previous section, but concentrates on the level of the sym-
bolic representations exclusively. This implies that a crucial analytical category in economics 
should be collective intentionality, as opposed to the methodological individualism that so far 
reigns supreme. 
4.2  Identity economics and the role of groups in social coordination 
The Searle approach lends a powerful conceptual framework to the naturalist interpretation of 
many foundational issues in economics. I give two examples. The first is the recent efforts to 
establish an ‘economics of identity’; the other is the role of ‘team preferences’. In both re-
gards, collective intentionality looms large. 
As we have seen, neuroeconomics clearly supports the idea that the individual cannot be 
modeled as a monolithic calculus of decision (even when referring to isolated decisions), but 
as a fragmented system of competing, balancing or conflicting forces, triggered by contextual 
factors. This raises the question how the coherence of behavior is constituted at all that we 
certainly observe in reality. In economics, the solution lies in the concept of identity that has 
been recently introduced into standard utility theory by Akerlof and Kranton (2000; 2005). 
However, in the Akerlof and Kranton approach identity is just treated as a given in a modified 
utility function, adding the important aspect that identity causes externalities between actions 
of different agents (for example, if I have a group identity, and others start to behave differ-
ently, they cause a negative externality on my identity). But how can we explain identity as 
such?  
I propose that identity is an emerging pattern on the language side of brain processes which 
operates as a higher-level restriction on the variability and indeterminacy of neuronal proc-
esses (following Ross, 2007; this is akin to Davis’, 2003, emphasis on the social embedded-
ness of identity). This idea has already been adumbrated by Ainslie’s (1992: Chapter 5) psy-
chological analysis of hyperbolic preferences (such as in the context of personal rules; there is 
a close affinity to personal construct theory in psychology, which also has received some at-
tention by economists, see Earl, 1990). In other words, identity works as a precommitment 
device to solve conflicts among diverging forces of motivation (ultimately explained as com-
peting neuronal patterns), which is mediated via the symbolic representation of a self-image. 
This image is continuously negotiated in communicative acts among people. For example, my 
emotional attachment to the identity as a ‘man’ is continuously reinforced by the processing 
of symbols in advertisements, and by communicating with other males and females. In this 
way, neuronal processes in the brain are inextricably linked up with a symbolic environment, 
coalescing in certain states of mind which make up my identity. Even if I wished to change 
my identity, that would require to change all the symbolic connections in which my identity is 
embedded, which is a difficult feat, because the meaning of the symbols is only marginally 
determined by myself, but by the understanding that prevails in a community of users of those 
symbols (dubbed ‘externalities’ by Akerlof and Kranton: If I change my identity, this also 
affects the others’ identity). The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of Finance 
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This implies that many of my actions are based on what ‘we’ want in a particular situation, 
and not simply what ‘I’ want. Many if not all decisions flow out from the identity of an agent, 
which is in turn a social category. As Davis (2007) has argued, this does not simply mean to 
reduce identity to social identity, because fundamental valuations of different possible social 
identities must be rooted in personal identity, which is related to the aforementioned ‘narra-
tives of the self’, i.e. the history specific to an individual. That is, collective intentionality can 
be neither reduced to the individual nor to group level, but is precisely an interactive phe-
nomenon. Such a notion of identity is directly relevant for finance studies, as it draws atten-
tion to the specific nature of the agents on financial markets, beyond the mere construct of 
‘rational agent’. For example, the ‘investor’ is in fact a specific sort of identity, with deep 
ramifications in culture and social context (Preda, 2005). 
Identities are directly related to human groups and find expression in the possibility of so-
called ‘team preferences’. Team preferences have been proposed in different contexts to solve 
dilemmas of rational coordination among economic agents (e.g. Hollis, 1998). A very simple 
and straightforward device to explain transitions from egoistic to altruistic or collectively-
minded behavior is the transition from the linguistic form ‘I’ to ‘We’, i.e. the constitution of 
collective intentionality à la Searle. This shift can be caused both by me and by the others. 
Uttering ‘we’ is inclusive, and might be related to the reinforcement of identities that I dis-
cussed in the previous paragraph. This does by no means imply that there is now a collective 
agent ‘existing’. In this sense, the ontological commitment to methodological individualism 
seems to be vindicated. But at the same time, the collective can be seen as supervening on 
individual states of mind that are triggered by the linguistic expression ‘we’ (for an extensive 
analysis of this, see Tuomela, 1995). This is precisely the notion developed by Sugden (2000) 
in a stringent economic approach. Sugden shows that team preferences do not eschew the ana-
lytical reliance on individual agency, but at the same time substantially modify the standard 
approach to rational choice. This is a model of ‘team-directed reasoning’ establishing actions 
as members of teams, and hence being directed at goals of teams. Thinking in teams and 
thinking in individuals depends on the framing of the decision problem. As we have seen, 
frames ultimately root in linguistic representations of the relevant situation. For  example, 
joining a football team implies that I put myself into another decision context, which coa-
lesces around the notion of the “we” of the team.  
This transition is backed by particular emotions, as we have discussed in the previous section. 
Joining the football team triggers a manifold of emotional and cognitive mechanisms which 
steer my decision making, effort and judgment when playing the game. The core issue is how 
we can explain that out of a complex and fluid interaction of neuronal processes ordered pat-
terns of behavior emerge. This is only possible via the causal loops that connect different 
brains  through  communication.  Out  of  this,  phenomena  such  as  the  identity  of  an  actor 
emerge. In this sense, the Akerlof and Kranton approach falls into the trap of the ‘homuncu-
lus’ fallacy in assuming that identity can be the object of maximization – by whom? Identity 
is constitutive of the agent. It cannot be a part of a utility function, because the specific form 
of the utility function depends on the identity, such as in the case of the switch towards team 
preferences. Thus, the notion of identity implies a fundamental paradigmatic shift in the the-
ory of decisions. 
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4.3  Implications for the theory of finance 
The concept of identities is immediately relevant for Behavioral Finance, as there much evi-
dence for an impact of identities on the market performance. It provides the perspective on the 
agent in Statman’s (1999) notion of ‘value-expressive’ action, because value-expressive ac-
tion confirms and signals the identity of the agent. It is the historical sequence of value-
expressive acts which constitute the agent, which therefore cannot be taken as being given 
exogenously, as in the theory of rational choice. 
For example, identities of individual and institutional investors are vastly different, and mar-
ket valuations depend on identities of corporations. Several anomalies in finance theory are 
related to identities, such as the home market effect, which implies that the assignment of in-
vestors to particular countries impacts on their investment behavior, or the conscious social 
framing of investment decisions by means of mental accounts or collective actions such as 
joining an investor’s club. Following Searle’s approach, all these phenomena are constitutive 
for individual decisions by means of embedding these decisions in patterns of collective in-
tentionality. For the observer, this translates into the notion of the normative and institutional 
structuring of behavior on the financial markets, beyond the mere rational optimization calcu-
lus. 
An important issue is the question what makes financial markets work at all, which is related 
to one of the fundamental ‘anomalies’ in finance, namely the large volume of transactions 
taking place, which contradicts criteria of market efficiency. The pure theory of finance does 
not make the social structure of trading explicit. Interestingly, in Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger’s 
(2002) work it was proposed that even the almost ‘perfect’ global forex markets manifest a 
social microstructure with global reach that is mediated via information technology. They 
argue that the continuous flow of deals is supported by a social network among traders which 
is driven by conversations, in which reciprocal exchange of information is mediated. Further, 
they show that markets require a special form of limited altruism, which is institutionally re-
flected in the role of ‘market makers’, but is also present in the actions of other traders. This 
means that traders sometimes act against their short-term financial interest in order to main-
tain the market, i.e. provide the market with liquidity. Such behavior can be supported by re-
ciprocal transactions among trader dyads, which allow for sanctions in case of violations of 
reciprocity. Thus, traders develop an identity as a group, which relates with the global market 
as a social institution, and they manifest team preferences, beyond their basic profit motiva-
tion. In illuminating case study for this role of group identity is the creation of new markets, 
which requires the creation of collective intentionality as a public good in the first stage, until 
sufficient liquidity is provided (see MacKenzie, 2006, on the creation of the first forex option 
market in Chicago). Group identity also plays a crucial role in maintaining the information 
flows  between  traders,  which  are  governed  by  reciprocal  altruism  and  run  alongside  the 
profit-maximizing market transactions. 
This sort of altruism is fundamental to understand the phenomenon of ‘trust’ in financial mar-
kets. Trust, though obviously essential for exchange, cannot be explained by the standard 
model of rational decision making (Nooteboom, 2002). In the standard approach of finance 
theory, trust is mainly seen as a macro-economic variable, with no microfoundation. The con-
cept of global microstructures establishes such a linkage, while eschewing standard rational The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of Finance 
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choice. Granted, once this level of analysis is introduced, the entire gamut of game theoretic 
approaches to cooperation and enforcement comes into play which offers many explanations 
of the possibility of  cooperation among self-interested players.  In principle, the argument 
would run in that way that in small groups with longer time horizons, cooperation becomes 
possible. But this argument does not question the essential fact that cooperation among non-
anonymous agents is a necessary condition even for financial markets to work.  
It is important to notice that this does not necessarily imply that the agents really know each 
other. With the intervening variable of identity, even unknown individuals might obtain iden-
tities which make them ‘familiar’, such that group-related mechanisms supporting cooperation 
may be triggered into operation. For example, traders at different financial centers have group 
identities, which are related with particular reputations (Zaloom, 2004). 
In sum, naturalism mark III guides research into the direction to ask for the creation of a so-
cial ontology of financial markets, in the sense of asking for the specific deontic powers in-
volved in the linguistic categories that structure the perception and the actions of agents. Here, 
naturalism clearly transcends neuroeconomics and turns into a sociology of financial markets, 
that is informed by insights of evolutionary psychology and biology (for a related approach, 
see Seabright, 2004). 
 
5  Conclusion: The broader picture and the research agenda for finance 
studies 
 
I have tried to show that the naturalist turn in economics will only be completed if it is ac-
companied by a linguistic turn. This linguistic turn is conceived as being naturalist, too, in the 
sense that linguistic phenomena become a part of causal explanations of observed phenomena. 
This does not imply reductionism, because the analysis of specific uses of language requires 
the application of specific methods. There is no feasible way to reconstruct the meaning of the 
symbols by reference to mere neuronal facts. They are causally related with neuronal facts 
only through being meaningful. On the other hand, neuroeconomic research might show that 
some symbols are linked up with certain neuronal or even hormonal patterns and others are 
not. This methodological position can be tagged with the label of ‘emergentist psychoneural 
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Fig. 1: The structure of the naturalistic paradigm 
 
Thus understood, economic naturalism is embedded into a larger naturalistic paradigm which 
builds on evolutionary theory (Witt, 2003: Chapter 1). The main principles are illustrated in 
fig. 1. Within the naturalistic framework we distinguish two fundamentally different, yet in-
teracting  evolutionary  processes,  namely  Lamarckian  evolution  that  takes  place  in  human 
culture and symbolic systems, and Darwinian evolution, that operates on the genetic base (for 
a related approach in biology, see Jablonka and Lamb, 2005). Though interacting, the two are 
autonomous (indicated by the thick bars between the two outer circles). There are competing 
claims about how these two evolutionary processes actually work, such as with reference to 
the relative role of epigenetic mechanisms or the modeling of cultural evolution by memes. 
But these differences are all discussed within the broader framework of naturalism, so they do 
not affect the argument in this paper. 
In this view, human mind emerges from the interaction of these two evolutionary processes, 
which implies that it cannot be treated as an individual entity in the sense of methodological 
individualism. Emergent psychoneural monism posits that the borderline of the processes be-
comes blurred here, because human behavior or, generally speaking, the human phenotype, is 
a vehicle for both. This translates into the interaction of two essentially different kinds of cau-
sation, namely symbolic and genetic/epigenetic. Mind and brain are two sides of the same 
coin, but this is only a static perspective. Dynamically, we deal with a case of ‘downward 
causation’ (Campbell, 1974), which is the condition for establishing the co-evolution of hu-
man culture and biology (which might be better dubbed ‘heterarchic causation’ because it 
works both ways). Causation operates via two opposing movements, with language emerging The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of Finance 
 
 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 105  27 
 
from biological processes, and at the same time language operating as a constraint on a subset 
of biological processes, namely neuronal phenomena. 
This is the general setting for the development of a paradigm for economics that can, in the 
longer run, substitute for the standard paradigm of rationality and equilibrium. For the field of 
finance, this approach would end up in the following research agenda. 
1.  The existing insights of Behavioral Finance need to be grounded in an evolutionary 
explanatory framework. This framework consists of functional analysis (i.e. proximate 
causes), mainly along the lines of neuroeconomics plus psychology, and of evolution-
ary analysis (i.e. ultimate causes), which provides an explanation of the behavioral 
patterns by reference to human phylogeny. Evolutionary psychology appears to be 
most appropriate inter-disciplinary counterpart. 
2.  This approach is non-reductionist in the sense that finance research has to make the 
causal processes on markets explicit, which boils down to the analysis of the interac-
tions and communication between agents, or, systems of brains. This implies that the 
evolutionary explanation of functional characteristics of human behavior has to be 
enlarged by the evolutionary analysis of language and symbolic systems that are com-
plementary to the coordination mechanism of prices and quantities. An essential di-
mension is the role of emotions in decisions and interactive behavioral patterns. Given 
the strong attention paid to the “rational” side of finance in the past, emotions should 
turn into the center of attention from now on. 
3.  The analysis of language needs to be related with the analysis of social networks that 
underlie the flow of market transactions. The notion of social network follows the ap-
proach of actor-network theory, that is, explicitly includes the role of technologies and 
other media of communication / interaction into its scope. A central concern is the 
construction of knowledge in financial markets, that is, to make the ‘socio-physical’ 
causation in information processing explicit. This also relates to research into market 
infrastructure, in the sense of which concepts, things and patterns of action concur in 
the emergence of financial markets. 
4.  This approach does not mean that mathematical modeling becomes less prominent. 
Rather, it means that a particular element of the traditional approach, namely the pure 
arbitrage mechanism, is less important. Instead, tools of network analysis, of complex 
adaptive systems, or of evolutionary game theory will become more important. 
As a result, Behavioral Finance would emerge as an alternative paradigm and would over-
come its current state, which is just a collection of anomalies and a number of fragmented 
law-like propositions. This paradigm would draw on biology, neuroscience, psychology and 
sociology, integrated by means of evolutionary theory. The pure theory of finance would be a 
part of that paradigm, because its most fundamental proposition, the theory of arbitrage, is 
also a building block in evolutionary theory. However, it is removed from the role as the piv-
otal point for the construction of theoretical hypotheses. 
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